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FAQ#8: Was there a Master Plan to use the Olympic Games to
Promote a Positive Image of China to the World ?
February 1, 2009 in Uncategorized by The China Beat | 3 comments

(And What was the Strategy for Dealing with the International Criticism on Human
Rights)?
(This is a shortened version of a paper presented at the conference on ““The 2008
Beijing Olympic Games: Public Diplomacy Triumph or Public Relations Spectacle?”
organized by the Center on Public Diplomacy, US-China Institute, and Center for
International Studies at the University of Southern California, January 29-30, 2009.)
There was a common perception outside China that the Beijing Olympic Games
involved a master plan to promote a positive image of China to the outside world and
that this was one of the major goals of hosting the Olympic Games, if not the major
goal. I want to argue that while there was widespread agreement in China that the
Olympics were an excellent opportunity to promote an image of China to the world, the
vast majority of the attention and effort was focused on the domestic audience; that
there was never a concrete communication strategy for dealing with the human rights
issue; and that in both instances, China’s ability to communicate a positive international
image was hindered by the domestic political structure.
The People’s Olympics
Many Western journalists and Amnesty International accused China of failing to keep its promises with respect to its
human rights record. But China had not made any such promises, and if journalists had read chapter five of my
recent book, Beijing’s Games, they would have known that there was a big internal debate about even the one
sentence about human rights that was made in China’s bid presentation in 2001.
However, in its bid China did make one promise that it arguably kept, and that was its promise to host a “people’s
Olympics.” There were three main themes for the Olympic Games: the High-tech Olympics, the Green Olympics, and
the renwen (人 文 奥 运 ) Olympics. Renwen is difficult to translate. It was sometimes translated as the “humanistic
Olympics,” but after some debate, the preferred official translation was the “People’s Olympics.” This theme was
originally intended as a response to the West’s criticism ofChina’s human rights, but this was never made explicit to
the West.
One of the central concepts of the People’s Olympics was 以人为本 , “take people as the root,” or “peopleorientation.” This phrase had appeared in political rhetoric when Hu Jintao named it in his address to the Third
Plenum of the 16th Party Congress in 2003. This preceded the inclusion of a passage on human rights in the revision
to the Constitution in 2004. It is interesting that as early as 2001, 以人为本 had already been written into the guiding
thought for the Beijing Olympic Games.

In 2000, Beijing Mayor Liu Qi began commissioning a number of groups with the task of
developing the basic thought behind the 人 文 奥 运 because he felt that, unlike the
other themes, it was unclear. The People’s University formed the Humanistic Olympic
Studies Centre to study it. One of the non-Communist Parties, the Democratic League,
was commissioned by Liu Qi and began developing working papers in 2001. Forums
were held, dissertations and books were written on the topic, working papers were
drafted, websites were created, and by the start of the Games it was estimated that at
least ten thousand pages had been written on the topic of the “People’s Olympics.”

Faculty members of the Beijing Sport University and the Humanistic Olympic Studies
Center of the People’s University were particularly involved with the relevant sport,
educational, and cultural organs of the central and Beijing government. Although they
had travelled abroad, these intellectuals were all largely focused on the domestic
audience and not the international audience. They gave dozens if not hundreds of
interviews to Chinese media, appeared frequently on CCTV, and were influential in
shaping domestic media opinion. They seldom gave interviews to foreign media and on
occasions when they did they were belittled as Party-liners (see these characterizations
of Beijing Sport University’s Ren Haiand People’s University’s Jin Yuanpu).
As a result of the orientation of the intellectuals who designed it, the guiding thought of
the People’s Olympics was largely diverted away from any focus on China’s
international image and into a debate over culture and education. In my interactions with
BOCOG and the intellectuals who were working with it, I felt that about 80-90% of the
effort that went into this symbol-making was directed toward the domestic audience.
The main focus was on the questions of how to manage the “combination of Eastern
and Western cultures” （东西结合）that the Games were supposed to facilitate, how to
promote Chinese culture within China and to the world, how to use the enthusiasm for
the games to raise the general quality (素质) and civility (文明) of the Chinese people,
how to prepare the next generation of young Chinese to take their place in the
international community.
These discussions and debates formed the intellectual context for Zhang Yimou’s
opening and closing ceremonies, the Olympic education programs in the schools that
reached as many as 400 million Chinese schoolchildren, the training programs for the
70,000 Olympic volunteers, the cultural performances in the Cultural Olympiad, and the
myriad of other cultural and educational activities that surrounded the Games.
Perhaps the major way in which the guiding thought about the promotion of China’s
national image was generated was through three keypoint research projects
commissioned by theNational Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science, which
is administered by the Central Propaganda Department. These grants are the
government’s way of channeling academic research in directions that serve its needs.
The relative unimportance of the Beijing Olympic Games is indicated by the fact that
from 2003 to 2008, only five related projects were funded, of which three were
“keypoint” projects with a competitive application process. By way of comparison, in the
same time period the number of funded projects that fell under the rubric of “MarxistLeninist Services” was 190, and under “Party History and Construction” was 178. The
first relevant Olympic project was the 2003 project entitled “Improving China’s
International Position and Reputation through the 2008 Olympic Games.”
The Beijing Sport University won the bid for this project and in April 2007 published the
results in Research on Improving China’s International Position and Reputation through
the 2008 Olympic Games (《２００８年奥运会提升中国国际地位和声望的研究》). Its
65 chapters contain thorough summaries of the issues that provoked negative media
reports in past Olympic Games, such as delays in venue completion, transportation
problems, media information glitches, terrorist acts, and so on. The lesson

that Beijing clearly learned was that these particular problems should be avoided at all
costs, and ultimately they avoided all the problems that got negative media coverage in
previous Olympics. The analyses of Western media coverage of the Beijing Games
since 2001 indicated that “political” issues – as they are called in China – would
dominate coverage. However, the resulting recommendations merely emphasize the
importance of treating the media and other leading opinion-makers well.
The most daring chapter, “Beijing Olympics Speed Up the Transformation of the
Functioning of the Government,” analyzes the promises made under the rubric of the
“People’s Olympics” – and improving human rights is not listed as one of them.
A second keypoint project of the National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social
Science was the 2006 project “Construction of the Humanistic Concept, Social Value
and National Image of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games” (《2008年北京奥运会的人文理
念、社会价值与国家文化形象构建》), which was awarded to the People’s University.
Through this project and elsewhere, the People’s University promoted its concept of the
“Cultural Olympics.” The final report has not been completed, but in a summary of their
conclusions on CCTV in February 2008, they argued that research shows that culture
constitutes the core of national image, and “therefore in the construction of a national
image, we should hold the line on ‘Cultural China’ （坚持走“文化中国”的路线）in
order to make the idea of ‘Cultural China’ into the core theme for dialogue between
China and the international community in Olympic discourse.”
So my first point is that if the “People’s Olympics” was the response to the West’s
human rights accusations, then that response was delivered in the form of culture and
symbols – the “look and image” of the Games, the “branding” of China, the display of
“Chinese culture” – and not in the form of verbal debate or dialogue. They were very
successful in the former, but the absence of the latter led critics to characterize the
Games as one big show orchestrated by the Party-state. This simple-minded view does
not do justice to the passion with which the producers of the People’s Olympics threw
themselves into fulfilling their mission of promoting Chinese culture and achieving its
integration with Western culture. I believe we should accord them more respect.
If the People’s Olympics was to be the response to Western criticism of China’s human
rights record, then it probably needed to directly address the issue of human rights, but
the topic was never directly taken on in the reports and research devoted to the topic.
But now we run into the structure of domestic control over discussions of human rights.
The sports scholars, philosophers, and members of non-communist parties who were
developing these documents were not likely to address such a sensitive topic as human
rights because it was not their job. The job of communicating China’s position on human
rights to the outside world one is one of the official responsibilities of the State Council
Information Office, which is simultaneously the Office of Foreign Propaganda of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party. This organ’s function is to act as the media
conduit between China and the outside world. The Information Office is under the Party
Central Committee’s Propaganda Department, which is the nerve center of China’s
thought control system. But the factionalism between the various “systems” （系统）of

the Chinese government is well-known, and the propaganda system is a different
system from the sport, cultural, and educational systems involved in creating and
implementing the People’s Olympics; its power base is in media and communications
circles. I did not see evidence that it had an active role in conceptualizing the People’s
Olympics.
National Image
While the other systems were doing their work, the Information Office was involved in a
separate effort, which involved a different group of intellectuals in the field of
communications, whose core was located at the Communications University of China.
The question of China’s national image had been the subject of a fair amount of
intellectual work, though not nearly as much as the multidisciplinary effort behind the
“People’s Olympics.” The third relevant keypoint project designated by the National
Planning Office for Philosophy and Social Science was the 2005 project, “The Design of
China’s National Image in Communications with the Outside World (对外传播中的国家
形象设计),” which was awarded to the Foreign Communications Research Center (对外
传播研究中心), a unit administered by the Foreign Languages Publishing Bureau, which
is in turn under the Party Central Committee. The major results of this project, which
involved scholars in communications atChina’s top universities, were published in April
of 2008 (Communication of a National Image, 《国家形象传播》). Among the 60
chapters, there is not one on the Beijing Olympics. The chapters that touch upon the
Olympics agree that Olympic Games are an excellent opportunity to promote a national
image; but they use the examples of the Tokyo 1964 and Seoul 1988 Olympic Games
as models for a promoting a positive image, and they do not offer the possibility that the
Games can promote a negative image. And so three years of work by China’s top
communications intellectuals failed to produce a strategy for dealing with attacks and
criticism.
Olympic China National Image Ad
If there had been a master plan for using the Olympics to promote China’s image, it
would have been developed by the Central Propaganda Department. The single person
most responsible for coordinating everything would have been Li Dongsheng, who was
simultaneously a member of the Party Central Committee, Vice Minister of the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce, and – more to the point here – Deputy
Director of the Central Propaganda Department, chief of BOCOG’s Media and
Communications Coordination Group, and president of the China Advertising
Association. Western media tended to make a big deal out of the American (Hill and
Knowlton) and British (Weber Shandwick) PR firms that had worked for BOCOG, but in
fact the non-Chinese viewpoint that they provided to BOCOG was only one among
many collected, and probably not the most influential – and in any case, BOCOG was
not empowered to discuss “political” issues.
So the major reason that there was no master PR plan was due to the strict division of
labor with regard to communications with the outside world, with only the organs under
the Central Propaganda Department empowered to speak about “political” issues. While

the sport, educational, and cultural systems were crafting their “cultural” messages, the
Information Office was engaged in a completely independent effort to produce a
television commercial for “China” at the end of 2007. The difficult eight-month birthing
process of the “Olympic China National Image Ad” indicates that if Li Dongsheng were
trying to develop more proactive communications with the outside world, he may have
had his opponents. The ad had been approved at the start of 2007, but it was not finally
pushed through until just before the end of the fiscal year. Pressure was exerted via a
long article entitled “Raise China’s Face – Where is China’s National Image Ad?” （《扬
起中国脸—中国国家形象广告在哪里》）which appeared in November 2007 in Modern
Advertising Magazine, a publication of the China Advertising Association of which Li
was president. The article was written with the help of scholars at the Communication
University of China and demonstrated the widespread support of the heads of China’s
major advertising firms. One section, “Using theOpportunity of the Olympics to Build a
National Image,” reviews the risk of negative media coverage but, like the other
publications discussed, it does not develop a communication strategy for responding to
it.
I was invited to be on the panel of academics that evaluated the bid presentations by
eight of the top advertising agencies with offices in China. After leaving the hotel where
we were sequestered, I never heard anything further about the project until the ad was
shown on CNN and BBC on August 8, the day of the opening ceremony. I have still not
seen it. Its release had been delayed from the original planned date of April because of
the torch relay protests and the Sichuan earthquake disaster. Local reports on the
internet make it seem that the project was not finally awarded to one of the advertising
firms, but instead to a production team formed by the Information Office. It was also
apparently cut to 30 seconds from the originally planned 90.
At the time, we were told that we were making history, because for the first
time China was reaching out to the world to try to shape its image, rather than waiting
for the world to come and understand it. Those involved in the process seemed to feel
that it was an extremely important first step. In December 2007 the Information Office
already expressed to me that it knew it was not effective in communicating a positive
image of China to the world. It evidently felt it needed a new strategy for dealing with the
human rights issue because in December 2008, it announced that together with the
Foreign Ministry it was spearheadingChina’s first-ever “Action Plan on Human
Rights,” which would be prepared for release in January by a panel including 50
institutions and NGOs. That this effort was spearheaded by the Information Office and
Foreign Ministry, and not by the ministries and offices that actually control human rights,
has led Western critics to describe it as a public relations ploy. However, another way of
looking at it is that because they are the interface with the outside world, these organs
are probably better versed on human rights debates than any others inChina. Also, the
Information Office’s close connection with the Central Propaganda Department is
necessary in dealing with a very important ideological issue. The Chinese
announcement states that it will not be just another white paper on human rights, but an
actual action plan with benchmarks. A more optimistic interpretation of this measure
might be that China’s international image is now being enlisted in a strategy to name

and shame the other state organs into closer adherence to international human rights
standards. I believe that the momentum for the action plan was strengthened by the
difficult experiences surrounding the Beijing Olympics.
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